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The introduction of the first Anti- Monopoly Law (AML) in the People’s 
Republic of China in 2008 constitutes a massive change towards the 
liberalisation of the market of the ‘communist giant’ China. Article 55 AML 
deals with the correlation of intellectual property rights and competition law 
which is a complex issue because monopolies are created by intellectual 
property rights whereas competition laws try to break up monopolies and 
prohibit harmful monopolistic conduct in order to maintain an effective 
competition on the market. With the formulation of Article 55 AML China 
has emphasized that exercises by intellectual property right holders can be 
exempted from the application of the AML as long as the intellectual 
property rights are not abused. This provision contains many uncertainties 
and carries ambiguity. This dissertation evaluates the understanding of 
Article 55 AML and analyses the different possibilities of interpreting it. 
Moreover, it depicts the concerns and risks companies might face when 
engaging in economic activities within China. Furthermore, this paper 
examines the draft of the first guidelines on that particular issue and 
compares the Chinese system to both the European Union and the United 
States of America that have a long history of competition laws. The 
approach of both jurisdictions might set an example to the Chinese 
enforcement agencies and the use of exemption provisions as well as the 
‘rule of reason’ might act as possible ‘signposts’ for the implementation of 
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In 2008 the People’s Republic of China published its first Anti- Monopoly Law 
(AML) and the law went into force on August 1, 2008.
1
 The AML was the result of 
debates and discussions of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic 
of China that had been going on for more than a decade.
2
 The AML is understood to 
be a ‘milestone of the country’s efforts in promoting a fair competition market and 
cracking down on monopoly activities’
3
 and it is declared to be the ‘Economic 
Constitution’
4
 of China by many specialists.  
This paper will concentrate on the correlation of competition law (antitrust 
law) and intellectual property law since this relationship has been part of continuing 
debates and discussions over the last years.
5
 Intellectual property law protects an 
individual by granting him exclusive rights to inventions, creations and the like; i.e. 
preventing other people from using the intellectual property in commerce without 
having obtained a license.
6
 Contrary to that anti- monopoly law or competition law 




 Despite the differences intellectual property law and anti- monopoly law also 
have important mutual goals such as enhancing consumer welfare and stimulating 
innovation.
8
 Intellectual property laws are important for innovation to take place 
because without a reward or better recoup of their investments, people would lose 
                                                 
1
 Anti- Monopoly Law (announced by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 30 
Aug 2007; effective 4 Aug 2008) further referred to as ‘Anti- Monopoly Law PRC’ available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182375, accessed on 7 June 2013. 
2
 DK Round & P Lin ‘Introduction: Embracing Competition in the World’s Second Giant Economy: 
China’s 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2012) RevIndOrgan-Springer 41 at 1-2. 
3
 N Peng ‘China’s First Anti- monopoly Law Takes Effect’ Xinhua News Agency (1 August 2008) at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/01/content_8901182.htm., accessed on 10 June 2013; also 
X Wang ‘Highlights of China’s New Anti- Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Journal No. 1 at 134. 
4
 P Jones ‘Licensing in China: The New Anti Monopoly Law, The Abuse of IP Rights and Trade 
Tensions (2008)  XLIII (2) Les Nouvelles: J. Licensing Soc’y Int’l 106 at 2 (see footnote 9 as well) 
saying that the AML is recognised widely – by both Chinese officials and scholars – as an ‘Economic 
Institution’ [经济宪法 (Jingji Xianfa)]. 
5
 A Schaub ‘Competition Policy Objectives’ in CD Ehlermann & LL. Laudati European Competition 
Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (1998) 119; see also W Kerber ‘Should 
competition law promote efficiency? Some reflections of an economist on the normative foundations 
of competition law’ in J Drexl & L Idot & J Monéger Economic Theory and Competition Law (2009) 
94; and also K Czapracka Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A Comparative Study of 
US and EU Approaches (2009). 
6
 DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 3,10,25. 
7
 R Whish Competition Law 6ed  (2009) 2-18. 
8
 I.e. this can be seen in the European Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of 












interest to research, develop and produce new products and the developing progress 
would come to a standstill.
9
 An economy without a working intellectual property law 
would fear more piracy taking place and the initial inventors will start reducing their 
investments in research and development which will finally lead to a decrease in 
economic development and eventually harm consumers.
10
 Thus, an effective 
intellectual property legislation will motivate undertakings to develop and will lead 
to the production of qualitatively improved goods which will contribute to the 
consumer welfare that is essential for an effective economy. Competition law is 
essential in an economy in order to stop dominant firms from abusing their power 




 Since both laws aim to protect the consumer in the end it is possible for them 
to coexist.
12
 Hence, intellectual property laws do not work against antitrust laws as 
long as the intellectual property right holder does not abuse his position (monopoly) 




With a population of 1.34 billion China is one of the largest nations, in terms 
of population, in the world
14
 and with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 7298.10 
billion US dollars one of the fastest growing economies
15
. These statistics show that 
it is crucial for an economy such as China to have its antitrust laws as well as its 
intellectual property laws set in place. The main questions in this paper will be the 
relationship of the new Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law and the intellectual property 
laws. In Article 55 of the Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law it is stated that: 
‘This law is not applicable to conducts by undertakings to implement 
their intellectual property rights in according with relevant IP laws and 
administrative regulations; however, this law is applicable to the 
                                                 
9
 DI Bainbridge, David I Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 18. 
10
 JF Rill & MC Schechter ‘International Anti- trust and Intellectual Property Harmonization of the 
Interface’ (2003) 34 Law & Pol’Y Int’l Bus 783. 
11
 R Whish Competition Law 6ed  (2009) 6. 
12
 Y Tian ‘The Impact of the New Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China & 
General Strategies for Technology- Driven Companies and Future Regulators’ (2007) Duke Law & 
Technology Review 4 *3. 
13
 Y Tian ‘The Impact of the New Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China & 
General Strategies for Technology- Driven Companies and Future Regulators’ (2007) Duke Law & 
Technology Review 4 *3. 
14
 Trading Economics ‘China Population’ http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/population 
(showing the population at the end of 2012), accessed on 10 June 2013. 
15
 Trading Economics ‘China GDP’ http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp (GDP in 2011), 












conduct by undertakings to eliminate or restrict market competition by 
abusing intellectual property rights.’
16
 
This dissertation shows that China recognizes the rights of intellectual property 
holders and takes into account in their competition law. However, this section of the 
Chinese AML was kept short which causes a lack of clarity and raises concerns for 
the entities working within China. This research will focus on the complex issue of 
the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law and try to 
find a way to understand the regulations stipulated in the Chinese Anti- Monopoly 
Law of 2007. 
Chapter 1 will focus on the interface of intellectual property rights and 
competition law and will give a detailed analysis of the objectives of both laws 
before discussing the differences and similarities the two areas of law have. 
Chapter 2 will provide an outline of both the history and the current system 
of the intellectual property regulations in the People’s Republic of China as well as 
the process and structure of the enacted Anti- Monopoly Law. 
In Chapter 3 Article 55 AML will be discussed in detail by analysing its 
content and the possible impact it might have on the entities doing business within 
China. Moreover, this research will contain a discussion about the content of future 
guidelines that are discussed by the State Council at the moment and the possible 




Chapter 4 analyses both the provisions in the laws of the European Union 
and the United States. China’s structure of the AML can be compared to the 
structure of the European Union competition rules that are set out in the Treaty for 
the Functioning of the European Union.
18
  Thus, the analysis of the European 
provision might provide a certain prediction of how the relationship between 
competition law and intellectual property law will be dealt with in China. In 
addition, the United States have a well developed competition system and use a 
                                                 
16
 Article 55 Anti- Monopoly Law PRC. 
17
 W Zhang ‘知识产权领域反垄断将出执法指南’ (translated: ‘The Guide to the Field of Intellectual 
Property Law and Antitrust Enforcement) SIPO State Intellectual Property Office (16 August 2012) 
available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2012/201208/t20120816_739355.html, accessed on 21 May 
2013. 
18
 Y Tian ‘The Impact of the New Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China & 
General Strategies for Technology- Driven Companies and Future Regulators’ (2007) Duke Law & 












different approach to the interface of antitrust and intellectual property. Since it is 
not clear at the moment which approach China will pursue the analysis of the 
provision in the United States could also act as a signpost for the anti- monopoly 
enforcement in the People’s Republic of China. 
 The aim of this dissertation is to provide a better understanding of the 
competition provisions and the correlation with the intellectual property laws in the 
People’s Republic of China and to give suggestions to investors and companies 












CHAPTER 1 – THE CONFLICT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND COMPETITION LAW 
In order to understand the conflict of competition law and intellectual property law 
this dissertation will first define the terms of competition and intellectual property 
before discussing the law thereof and outlining the goals of each in order to compare 
and contrast them. 
I. The Goals of Intellectual Property Law 
1. Definition of Intellectual Property 
First, one needs to understand what intellectual property means. The term 
‘intellectual property’ can also be described as ‘intangible property’ and is a form of 
property that cannot be captured with bare hands in contrast to an object that can be 
held and the possession of it usually indicates the ownership. Intellectual property is 
a creation of the mind and includes ‘inventions, literary and artistic works, and 
symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce’
19
 In other words, the subject 
matter of intellectual property is the result of new ideas produced by human beings.
20
  
Intellectual property includes but is not limited to patents for inventions, registered 
and unregistered designs, copyright, rights in performances, trade marks, passing off, 
law of breach of confidence and malicious falsehood.
21
 According to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) intellectual property rights can be 
organized in two categories, namely industrial property and copyright and related 
rights where the former consists of patents, geographical indications, industrial 
designs and trade marks and the latter includes literary and artistic works.
22
  
According to some academics intellectual property rights can be put into 
three categories; first, there is industrial property including patents and trade secrets, 
where the invention or information is captured to stop others from using it; secondly, 
there are intellectual property rights that can protect appearance and form and 
copyright gives the aimed protection of expression; thirdly there are intellectual 
                                                 
19
 WIPO ‘What is Intellectual Property?’ http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/, accessed on 6 May 2013. 
20
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 2. 
21
 DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 3. 
22
 As it can from the Berne and Paris Conventions: Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (9 September 1886, last revised at Paris 24 July 1971, amended 1979)  S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 99-27 and Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (20 March 1883, last 
revised 14 July 1967, amended 28 September 1979) 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303; also WIPO 












property rights that protect the reputation or the image of the owner such as trade 
marks and the tort of passing off.
23
 
A good way of understanding intellectual property is by contrasting it with 
other forms of property such as the ‘right in rem’
24
. Taking a book as an example it 
can be both the object of intellectual property rights and property rights ‘in rem’. If 
someone destroys the book the property right of the owner is harmed whereas the 
intellectual property right (copyright) stays unharmed; this can be explained by 
defining intellectual property law as the protection of the idea
25
 regulating the 
creation and use of the intangible property.
26
 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that intellectual property rights are 
subject to certain limitations. These include limitations in duration
27
 or subject matter 
such as the fact that a normal everyday idea cannot be protected because this would 
limit the society’s liberty.
28
 Also, most intellectual property laws contain some 
exceptions to infringement, where for example unauthorised use of a copyright 
protected good is not infringement as long as it is ‘fair use’, meaning that using the 
good for personal use and not for commercial use is allowed.
29
 
2. The Objectives of Intellectual Property Law 
Furthermore, the objectives of intellectual property law need to be analysed. First of 
all one can look at the benefits the owner of an intellectual property right gets. The 
law for intellectual property rights aims at protecting information and ideas of the 
producer or creator that are economically valuable.
30
 When the inventor or author of 
an intellectual property right receives protection he/ she will become the monopolist 
of that certain property and can prevent others from using it, copying it or selling it 
without having obtained a permission in form of a license or the like.
31
 Hence, 
                                                 
23
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 2.  
24
 Including both immobile property and tangible property. 
25
 In copyright: idea encompassed in a material form. 
26
 W Alberts ‘What is Intellectual Property?’ (November 2007) De Rebus Archived Issues. 
27
 Duration of IPRs: Patents are only protected for a certain period of years; copyright is usually 
protected for the life of the other plus some years and therefore also limited; trade marks can be 
protected perpetually as long as the license is always renewed. 
28
 J Hughes ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988-89) 77 Geo.L.J.287 at 291,295. 
29
 J Hughes ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988-89) 77 Geo.L.J.287 at 295. 
30
 W Cornish & D Llewelyn & TF Aplin Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights 7ed (2010) 6. 
31
 W Cornish & D Llewelyn & TF Aplin Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 












intellectual property rights are of a negative nature.
32
 The owner of the right has the 
exclusive right to exploit it and prevent others from exploiting it by all means. This is 
true for all different kinds of intellectual property. Trade marks and trade secrets can 
exist in perpetuity and can be regarded as ‘qualified monopolies’ subject to 
limitations such as treaty and legislative limitations for trade marks and contractual 
limitations concerning trade secrets. Patents constitute a ‘qualified monopoly’ for a 
limited period and limited to the institution of compulsory licensing.
33
 Compulsory 
licensing is the situation where a government can order the intellectual property right 
holder to issue a license to a certain company subject to reasonable remuneration to 
be paid by the licensee for the purpose of improving social welfare by satisfying 
domestic demands.
34
 The holder of a plant breeder’s right also obtains a ‘qualified 
monopoly’ which means that ‘reverse engineering’ is legal.
35
 Copyright and related 
rights constitute a ‘relative monopoly’ because other creators are not prohibited to 
come up with the same or similar idea independently.
36
 
 For the purpose of understanding the different objectives underlying 
intellectual property law one has to distinguish between the different forms of such. 
Concerning copyright and related rights the ultimate goal is the enhancement of 
creativity by for example giving the author of a book or the painter of a painting a 
reward for his/ her creative efforts.
37
 Regarding industrial property a distinction 
needs to be made between patents, industrial designs and trade secrets and those 
property forms that protect distinctive signs such as trade marks and passing off. 
Patents, industrial designs and trade secrets are mainly protected for the reason of 
innovation, creating technology and design and incentivise the producer by giving 
him/ her a financial reward; the World Trade Organisation (WTO) states that ‘the 
social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the 
development of new technology’
38
. Moreover, the WTO argues that an effective 
                                                 
32
 DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 11. 
33
 I.e. Chapter VI Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (announced by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress 12 March 1984, effective 1 April 1985, amended 1992, 
2000, 2008) further referred to as ‘Patent Law PRC’ available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=178664, accessed on 17 May 2013. 
34
 I.e. when the company does not use the patent properly; J Kuanpoth ‘Intellectual Property and 
Access to Essential Medicines: Options for Developing Countries’ (2004) Journal of Generic 
Medincines: The Business Journal for Generic Medicines Sector Vol 2 No 1 at 56-57.  
35
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 35.  
36
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 35.  
37
 WTO ‘What are Intellectual Property Rights?’ 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm, accessed on 8 May 2013. 
38












intellectual property regime should also focus on the transfer of technology by means 
of foreign direct investments, licensing and the formation of joint ventures.
39
 The 
intellectual property law concerning the use of distinctive signs aims at stimulating 
and securing fair competition on the market and i.e. trade marks are used for the 
purpose of distinguishing one good from another and to assist consumers when 
buying a good because a certain quality and reputation is linked to the mark itself.
40
 
 Taking all forms of intellectual property into account it can be said that the 
producer’s or creator’s rights can be justified publicly and privately. A public 
justification is given by the fact that once the recoupment of investment is ensured 
the companies will employ more people which results in a better social well-being of 
the society; moreover, once the protection is assured the producer or creator will 
release his/ her invention or creation to the public and this will lead to spreading of 
information and ultimately to the increase of knowledge in the society.
41
 From a 
private point of view it can be argued that intellectual property rights arise naturally 
as the outcome of hard work.
42
 
 Summarizing one can say that intellectual property law strives to protect the 
producers or creators of an intellectual commodity and grants them the right to 
control the use of the good to be rewarded for the money and time they spent on 
achieving a certain outcome; keeping in mind that the intellectual creation is 
protected and not the good itself.
43
 Without the protection of intellectual property 
rights the producers or creators would not have incentives and likely would cause a 
stop to research and development and the production or creation of intellectual goods 
which would eventually lead to the stagnation of development in the countries.
44
 
With no legal protection, the producers or creators would stop or at least reduce their 
work once they fear piracy taking place and this will result in less research and 
development and ultimately harm the consumers who cannot purchase the best 
                                                 
39
 WTO ‘What are Intellectual Property Rights?’ op cit. 
40
 A Griffith ‘A Law-and-Economics Perspective on trade marks’ in L Bently & J Davis & JC 
Ginsburg Trade Marks and Brands (2008) 245; also DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 
689. 
41
 DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 18. 
42
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 45. 
43
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use (2008) 3 available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf , 
accessed on 8 May 2013 
44












quality and technology anymore but have to remain with the old or less innovative 
products. 
45
   
II. The Goals of Competition Law 
1. Definition of Competition 
Competition can be defined as ‘the activity or condition of striving to gain or win 
something by defeating or establishing superiority over others’.
46
 An adequate 
definition of competition is essential for economic thinking and competition policy.
47
 
Placing it in an economic context competition can be seen as the process of two 
competitors on the market aiming to have as many consumers as possible in order to 
increase market shares and earn more profit.
48
 However, the freedom to compete is 
premised on a market place that works effectively, meaning that the different market 
operators cannot be obliged to compete but nevertheless competition is encouraged.
49
 
The freedom to compete is limited where actual harm to others is caused by 
processes such as exploiting customers or unjustified exclusion of other competitors 
in the market.
50
 Perfect competition can generally be defined as the stage at which 
every operator on the market is a price taker and only normal profits are earned.
51
 In 
perfect competition it can be said that once the profits of one competitor increase a 
new operator will enter the market and push the price levels down again.
52
  
Practically, it is difficult to predict when and if this will occur given the many 
variables that influence the behaviour of participants in the market. However, 
competition law is a tool used to intervene in the market to steer the dynamics of the 
market as closely as possible in the direction of perfect competition. 
Competition can exist in horizontal ways between two operators in the same 
product market as well as vertical among companies in the distribution chain.
53
 As 
                                                 
45
 JF Rill & MC Schechter ‘International Anti- trust and Intellectual Property Harmonization of the 
Interface’ (2003) 34 Law & Pol’Y Int’l Bus 783. 
46
 Oxford Dictionaries ‘Competition’ available at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/competition, accessed on 22 March 2013. 
47
 RH Bork The Antitrust Paradox: a Policy at War with Itself (1978) 61.  
48
 MM Dabbah International and Comparative Competition Law (2010) 20.  
49
 D Zimmer ‘The basic goal of competition law: to protect the opposite side of the market’ in D 
Zimmer The Goals of Competition Law (2012) 495; see too MM Dabbah International and 
Comparative Competition Law (2010) 20- 21. 
50
 MM Dabbah International and Comparative Competition Law (2010) 21. 
51
 The Economist ‘Competition’ http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/c#node-21529807, 
accessed on 7 June 2013. 
52
 The Economist ‘Competition’ op cit. 
53












one can see it is hard to find a single definition for competition. Fuchs, a Professor of 
Law and Judge in Germany, argues that there is no need for an exact definition of 
competition law for every kind of economic behaviour and that identifying particular 




2. The Objectives of Competition Law 
Defining the exact goals is a difficult exercise. Experts have debated the precise 
goals of competition law for many years.
55
 The overall aim of competition law is to 
establish economic efficiency in the best possible way and hence promote 
competition.
56
 It has been agreed upon that this can be achieved by ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources which will lead to the enhanced consumer welfare.
57
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has defined 
consumer welfare as being ‘the individual benefits derived from the consumption of 




In order to identify all possible goals of competition law effectively many 
authorities, political institutions and other organisations have divided the objectives 
of competition into three categories, namely economic, social and political goals.
59
 
From an economic perspective competition law mainly revolves around the 
issues of maximisation of consumer welfare and economic efficiency; some 
discussions exist whether consumer welfare should be enhanced or total welfare.
60
 
Most countries however have implemented competition laws that focus on consumer 
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 There are two schools of thought that have influenced the understanding of 
competition and the law thereof in the United States and abroad.  
First is the Harvard School that uses a ‘structuralist’ approach to competition 
law by putting most emphasis on the structure of the market and arguing that the 
more concentrated the relevant market is the more likely it is that competitors will 
engage in anti- competitive conduct and dictatorial intervention is crucial; one of the 




Secondly, the Chicago School of Thought evolved in the 1960s pursuing the 
opinion that the main aim of competition law is to maximise efficiency and thus 
protect competition itself and not focus on protecting individuals.
63
 Bork, a leading 
economist and Chicago scholar, argues that the maximisation of consumer welfare is 
the single goal of competition law and that adequate consumer welfare is reached 
once it cannot be increased anymore by judicial- decision making.
64
 Bork is of the 
opinion that the courts need to differentiate between conduct increasing wealth 
through efficiency, and harmful conduct decreasing the latter.
65
 However, other 
economists argue that the development of the market economy, the promotion of 
trade and the facilitation of economic liberalisation are also economic aims of 
competition law, especially in developing economies.
66
  
Many countries also take social goals such as protecting the consumer from 
undue exercise of market power, protecting smaller sized firms, distributing wealth 
and public interest considerations into account.
67
 This social approach to competition 
law can be explained by the fear of private powers and can be justified on grounds of 
market democracy and economic equity.
68
 
The question then arises as to whether any political goals exist in competition 
analysis. Many lawyers as well as many economists are of the opinion that 
competition law should be fully separated from politics because on one hand political 
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involvement will lead to a certain degree of uncertainty and controversy and on the 
other hand it will diminish the importance of economists in the field of competition 
law; however there is often a political aspect when looking at the decision of the 
competition authorities.
69
 One example to illustrate a political goal is the aim of 
establishing individual liberty on the market and by that, providing the consumers 
with a choice of goods by lowering the barriers to enter the market even though they 
might be inefficient sometimes.
70
 
As one can see defining the goals of competition law in a self-contained way 
is hardly possible. Based on history and experience countries differ in their 
objectives of competition law and lay emphasis on different aspects. However, 
everyone is agreeing that consumer or total welfare is the main aim when pursuing a 
competition policy. 
III. The Differences and Similarities  
In order to understand what the conflict between intellectual property rights and 
competition law is one has to analyse the differences and similarities they share. The 
major difference can be found when looking at the result of an intellectual property 
right being granted in contrast to the goal of competition law trying to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources.
71
 Intellectual property law protects an individual by 
granting him exclusive rights to inventions, creations and the like
72
; i.e. preventing 
other people/ companies from using the intellectual property in commerce without 
having obtained a license.
73
 Contrary to that anti- monopoly law or competition law 
tries to stop monopolistic actions to achieve a market order with a fair competition 
taking place.
74
 Thus, there exists a huge divergence between intellectual property law 
and competition law as the former establishes monopolies, whereas the latter aims at 
breaking up monopolies to ensure a better functioning market. 
                                                 
69
 MM Dabbah International and Comparative Competition Law (2010) 42- 43. 
70
 Example from the United States in HM Blake & WK Jones ‘In Defense of Antitrust’ (1965) 65 
Columbia Law Review 377 at 383-384.  
71
 W Kerber ‘Should competition law promote efficiency? Some reflections of an economist on the 
normative foundations of competition law’ in J Drexl & L Idot & J Monéger Economic Theory and 
Competition Law (2009) 94-95; see too A Schaub ‘Competition Policy Objectives’ in CD Ehlermann 
&  LL Laudati European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (1998) 
119.  
72
 K Czapracka Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A Comparative Study of US and EU 
Approaches (2009) 36. 
73
 DI Bainbridge Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 3,10,25. 
74












Despite the differences intellectual property law and anti- monopoly law also have – 
as it can be seen from the previous analysis – important mutual goals such as 
enhancing consumer welfare and stimulating innovation.
75
 Innovation is a very 
important process for the society of a nation and it is unanimously agreed upon that 
incentives need to be given to an inventor or creator to enhance innovation.
76
 
Intellectual property laws are important for innovation to take place because without 
a reward or better recoup of their investments, people would lose interest to research, 
develop and produce new products and the developing progress would eventually 
come to a standstill.
77
 However, intellectual property protection could also stifle 
development and innovation because of high costs of transaction and also, the spread 
of intellectual property rights obtained by different companies shows difficulties in 
the access to such rights.
78
 Weakly formulated intellectual property laws will lead to 
companies blocking the entry to the market by other firms.
79
 There have been 
continuous debates about the positive and negative effects of intellectual property 
laws on growth and development.
80
 A major difference is the impact of intellectual 
property legislation in developing countries as opposed to in industrialised 
countries.
81
 In countries with a working economy intellectual property rights are 
generally held to promote innovation whereas in less developed countries with no 
capacity to innovate intellectual property rights can often stifle the economic 
development because of all the social and economic costs occurring.
82
 Nevertheless, 
an economy without a working intellectual property law would fear more piracy 
taking place and the initial inventors will start reducing their investments in research 
and development which will finally lead to a decrease in economic development and 
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 Many developing countries have started strengthening 




In contrast to that, competition law is essential in an economy in order to stop 
dominant firms from abusing their power and acting as price setters so that 
consumers can get the best quality products at the lowest price possible.
85
 
Competition is seen as the major motivation for undertakings to be innovative.
86
 
Competition law aims at ensuring that a fair competition on the market takes place 
which stimulates the different companies in the same or comparable sector to 
improve or invent new products that will lift their reputation on the market and 
eventually will result in more sales.
87
 Being innovative is a costly exercise for the 
entities competing on the market and with no intellectual property protection these 
costs would deter companies from engaging in research and development, especially 
concerning products that are easy to copy.
88
 
 Since both laws aim to protect the consumer in the end it is possible for them 
to coexist.
89
 However, this coexistence of the two laws can only be working 
effectively as long as an intellectual property right holder does not abuse its 
monopolistic position.
90
 This occurs very often when an intellectual property right 
holder has a certain market power because of an invented product and uses the 
market power to a greater factor than legally justified by conduct such as driving 
other competitors out of the market or exploiting the consumers by charging usurious 
prices.
91
 Thus, a monopolist can control the market by regulating prices, quantity, 
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 It can be said that too comprehensive intellectual property 
legislation will have a negative impact on competition and will prevent innovation 
taking place.
93
 In contrast to that too strict competition policy or legislation can result 
in a restriction of intellectual property right protection and will also lead to less 




In 2003 the US Federal Trade Commission issued a report that focussed 
especially on the balance of competition and patent law and policy. In this report it 
was stated that innovation is a great benefit to consumers and that this can be 
achieved by a good balance between the two areas of law because both intellectual 
property and competition policy enhance or stimulate innovation
95
; however, if 
patent law would allow too ‘obvious’ patents being registered it could diminish 
competition in the fields where these ‘obvious’ patents were used and vice versa, if 




Hence, intellectual property laws do not work against antitrust laws as long as 
the intellectual property right holder does not abuse his position (monopoly) by 
illegal means. The majority of the academics argue that these two laws do not stand 
in conflict to each other and hence, have to be balanced correctly to increase wealth 




                                                 
92
 C Colston & J Galloway Modern Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2010) 35. 
93
 K Czapracka Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A Comparative Study of US and EU 
Approaches (2009) 37. 
94
 YTian ‘The Impact of the New Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China & 
General Strategies for Technology- Driven Companies and Future Regulators’ (2007) Duke Law & 
Technology Review 4 *3; JF Rill & MC Schechter ‘International Anti- trust and Intellectual Property 
Harmonization of the Interface’ (2003) 34 Law & Pol’Y Int’l Bus 783. 
95
 Federal Trade Commission ‘The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy’ 
(October 2003) FTC Report Executive Summary at 1.  
96
 Federal Trade Commission ‘The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy’ 
(October 2003) FTC Report Executive Summary at 1. 
97
 This argument was first brought forward by W Bowman Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and 
Economic Appraisal (1973) as quoted in K Czapracka Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust 
– A Comparative Study of US and EU Approaches (2009) 37 footnote 3; see also Y Tian ‘The Impacts 
of the Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China & General Strategies for 












CHAPTER 2 – THE HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
This chapter will provide an outline of the Chinese Intellectual Property Law and the 
Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law for the purpose of understanding how the Chinese 
systems developed in order to be able to analyse the impact the competition law has 
on the protection of intellectual property rights and vice versa. 
I. The History of Chinese Intellectual Property Law 
Compared to other jurisdictions in the world the law of intellectual property arrived 
very late in the People’s Republic of China and is still evolving. 
1. The Start of Intellectual Property 
The late development can be explained by looking at China’s history and analysing 
which theories mainly formed the common thinking in China. The neglect of 
intellectual property protection leads back to the theories and principles that evolved 
from the doctrine of Confucianism.
98
 Traditionally knowledge was seen as a 
common good and developing or creating a product was recognized as an 
achievement of a whole family or even the community as a whole and should be 
shared amongst them.
99
 Contrary to other cultures the Chinese actually see copying 
or stealing as ‘the highest form of flattery and respect’
100
 and part of the learning 
process for the younger generations.
101
  
It took centuries to move from no protection to a basic protection of 
intellectual property as private property rights and some regulations were created 
during the Qing Dynasty in the late nineteenth century after having been forced by 
some Western Powers; first a concept of trademark was introduced, then patent and 
copyright protection.
102
 The Qing Dynasty aimed to change from manual work to 
industrial work by assisting to establish new companies with trained workers; in 
order to achieve that change the government needed to give incentives to the people 
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and so from 1882 a 10-year protection of industrial techniques was granted by 
Emperor Guangxu.
103
 The first actual laws concerning technology were the ‘Reward 
Regulations on the Development of Technology’ which was released in 1898.
104
 
Although everything was set in place, this regulation never took effect and the 
hypothetical owners of intellectual property rights were proud to share their 
inventions and creations with other people for free.
105
 After being put under pressure 
by the Western powers the Qing Dynasty finally changed its laws and established the 
first trademark law (‘Interim Trademark Registration Regulation of 1904’) and  the 
first copyright law (‘Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910’) of China.
106
 Although the 
regulations were finally put into place they were never enforced.
107
  
2. The Era of Mao Zedong  
Neither during the republican era after the fall of the Qing Dynasty nor during the 
chaos after the unification from 1926 to 1949 emphasis was laid on the development 
of intellectual property rights but a trend towards a protection was visible.
108
 In 
October 1949 the People’s Republic of China was founded by the Communist Party 
after the civil war with the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and all the existing laws 
were abolished.
109
 The theories of Marxism and later Maoism did not help the 
growth of strong intellectual property rights because they were against the protection 
of private property and instead strongly supported collective property.
110
 However, 
the Communist Party of China (CCP) did formulate a patent regulation ‘Provisional 
Regulations on the Protection of Invention Rights and Patent Rights’ in 1950 by 
which the patentee was given a ’certificate of invention’ and some monetary reward, 
whereas the exploiting rights were granted to the state exclusively; if on the other 
hand the patentee applied for a ‘certificate of patent’, the patentee obtained the right 
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to exploit it himself/ herself.
111
 Up until 1958 only four patents were issued which 
demonstrates that the system was not very efficient.
112
  
Due to the strengthening communist movement in China the regulations were 
changed in 1963 and Article 23 of the new Regulations on Awards for Inventions 
gave all rights to the state (‘nobody or no unit shall have the monopoly of the 
invention’).
113
 The CCP also enacted laws regulating trademarks and copyright in the 




3. After the Cultural Revolution 
In 1976 the Chinese Government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping introduced 
a new policy called ‘Four Modernizations’ that ultimately wanted China to attain the 
level of the world powers by improving the technology, the science, the agriculture 
and the industry.
115
 Intellectual property rights were a huge obstacle for the orthodox 
socialist regime since intellectual property rights eventually lead to monopolies 
which are against the theories of socialism; however, the CCP saw the importance 
for a policy and for the world trade.
116
 Intellectual property protection was 
considered to incentivise creation and innovation, improve the functioning of the 
market, attract foreign investment and stimulate foreign trade.
117
 The Regulations in 
Awards for Technical Improvements and the Regulations on Awards for Invention 
were introduced in 1978 but primarily focussed on the promotion of technology 
instead of protection of individuals.
118
 Due to the fast development of China’s 
economy during the 1980s and 90s the importance of intellectual property protection 
grew.
119
 Following that China laid intellectual property rights down in the Fifth 
Constitution of China and developed the Trademark Law in 1982, the Patent Law in 
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1984, the Copyright Law in 1990 and in 1991 it enacted the Regulations on 
Protection of Computer Software. Also the People’s Republic of China joined 
several important intellectual property treaties such as the WIPO in 1980, the Paris 
Convention in 1984, the Berne Convention in 1989 and the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty in 1994.
120
 At that time however, the copyright, patent and trademark laws 
lacked certain requirements such as scope and applicability to everyone as well as 
certain remedies for stealing trade secrets.
121
  
For example the major problem of the Patent Law was its very narrow scope 
and the fact that protection was not equally given to nationals and foreigners- this 
was only changed due to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
United States and China.
122
 The MOU was signed by both countries in 1992 and 
resulted from discussions between China and the United States concerning the 




4. Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law 
(TRIPS) 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001
124
  and by that 
time had to comply with all the conventions; it was not given a transition period like 
other developing countries.
125
 Therefore, from 2001 onwards the Chinese intellectual 
property laws had to be compliant with the minimum standards laid down in 
TRIPS
126
. Prior to entering the WTO China amended the intellectual property laws 
many times, announced administrative regulations and tried to focus on guidelines 
for the implementation of the new legislation.
 127
 By 2001 the laws were fully TRIPS 
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compliant but the enforcement system was and still is lacking efficiency and 
intellectual property holders fear piracy.
128
 
II. The History of Chinese Competition Law 
The conception of anti- monopoly law in China evolved very late and permitting 
competition on the market was not important. This can be explained by the Marxist- 
Leninist- Maoist doctrines that saw the idea of a market economy as wrong in nature 
concerning morals and traditions.
129
 When the People’s Republic of China started to 
reform its country after the Cultural Revolution new laws and regulations had to be 
established in order to become more suitable for international trade. For the last 
thirty years the growth of the People’s Republic has been tremendous and the 




1. The Way to a Competition Law  
For the purpose of improving international acceptance a drafting group was formed 
in 1987 that was ordered to look at the competition issue in China and try to draft a 
useable anti- monopoly law for the Republic.
131
 For unknown reasons the drafting 
group was only able to produce a rough draft of a possible competition law in 
1993.
132
 No further progress on the legislative process could be noticed until 1994 
when the State Council founded another group which was aimed at developing a 
competition law and only twelve years later a draft of the Anti- Monopoly Law was 
given to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for revision (24 
June 2006).
133
 The Chinese legislative authority took a whole different approach to 
the forming of a competition law than other developed or developing countries which 
can be explained by the socialist theories and the totalitarian government of the 
Communist Party that hindered competition laws to evolve.
134
 The People’s Courts 
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lacked a lot of experience and were too dependent on the government and only had a 
minor role in forming a competition law for the emerging market economy.
135
 
However, this slow process does not mean that China had no laws concerning 
competition at all- in 1993 it promulgated the Anti- Unfair Competition Law, in 1993 
the Law on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, in 1994 the Advertising 
Law, in 1997 the Price Law, in 1999 the Bidding Law, in 2002 the Government 
Procurement Law, in 2003 the Law on Ports and in 2004 the Foreign Trade Law; all 
these regulations contained rules concerning monopolies and similar conducts.
136
 All 
these different laws were too superficial and lacked coherency; they could rarely be 
enforced and China finally needed a comprehensive competition system.
137
 It is very 
interesting to notice that China was very eager to seek advice from other jurisdictions 




2. The current Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law of 2007 
The Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law was enacted on 30 August 2007 and took effect in 
1 August 2008. The Chinese AML has been recognized worldwide as an ‘Economic 
Constitution’
139
  and has also been described as a ‘milestone of the country’s efforts 




The new AML consists of eight chapters and fifty- seven articles; Chapter I – 
General Provisions, Chapter II – Monopoly Agreements, Chapter III – Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position, Chapter IV – Concentration of Business Operators, 
Chapter V – Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition, 
Chapter VI – Investigation into Suspicious Monopolistic Conduct, Chapter VII – 
Legal Liabilities and Chapter VIII – Supplementary Provisions. 
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3. Goal of the Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law 
The purpose of this new competition law is laid out in Article 1 of the AML that 
states: 
‘This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and curbing 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair market competition, enhancing 
economic efficiency, maintaining the consumer interests and the public 




Except from the last goal concerning the socialist market economy all these goals are 
internationally recognized competition goals.
142
 In comparison the South African 
Competition Act has a clause for the purpose stating that efficiency, adaptability and 
development of the economy shall be promoted, consumers as well as small- or 





Article 2 of the AML stipulates that the law is applicable to ‘monopolistic conducts 
in economic activity within the territory of the People’s Republic of China’ and to 
behaviour outside the territory if it has an ‘eliminating or restricting’ effect on 
China’s domestic competition and market. The law does not exclude the international 
or foreign companies and is therefore also applicable to them if they act in a way that 
would harm the Chinese market. 
In Article 55 of the AML an exception to the application is made by 
excluding the legal ‘conduct of business operators to exercise their intellectual 
property rights’. However, it will be applicable once the intellectual property rights 
are abused. 
5. Enforcement Divisions 
Article 9 and 10 of the AML orders the State Council to establish two agencies being 
the Anti- Monopoly Commission (AMC) and the Anti- Monopoly Enforcement 
Agency (AMEA). The AMC is responsible for ‘organizing, coordinating and 
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 the competition on the market and will consist of various government 
officials who are not necessarily competition experts
145
, whereas the AMEA is 
responsible for the enforcement of the anti- monopoly legislation.
146
 Article 10 of the 
AML gives the AMEA the right to assign its power to the governments of the 
municipalities, the autonomous regions and the provinces.  
 Since the AML does not say how the AMEA will be structured and which 
agency will enforce the law, one can assume that all three agencies that already 
existed prior to the AML will continue to work on competition issues and the 
enforcement thereof.
147
 Before the AML was enacted the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) was ordered to enforce the previous laws concerning 
monopolistic conduct, whereas the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was 
addressed to control the mergers of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was ordered to enforce the 
prohibitions on price fixing.
148
  
6. The Subject Matter 
The AML contains prohibitions to ensure that the competition on the market will not 
be harmed. They can be split up into three different sections:  
Chapter II deals with monopolistic agreements including different types of 
horizontal agreements between two competing businesses (i.e. fixing prices, jointly 
boycotting transactions etc)
149
 and vertical agreements between an entity and its 




Chapter III sets out the rules for the ‘abuse of dominant position’ and 
specifies the factors of determining the dominance of an entity.
151
 The prohibitions 
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include but are not limited to practices such as exclusive dealing, price 
discrimination and refusal to deal.
152
 
Chapter IV of the AML deals with the regulations concerning the 
concentration of the market including mergers and several forms of acquisition.
153
 It 
also stipulates in Article 21 AML that the threshold for notifying the merger will be 
specified by the State Council every year. 
From this structure one can see that the structure of the Chinese AML is very 
similar to the structure found in the competition law of the European Union.
154
 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
155
 
stipulates the rules regarding monopoly agreements, Article 102 deals with the abuse 
of dominance and the concentration practices are dealt with in the European 




In summary it can be said that the People’s Republic of China has finally – after 
many discussions – established competition legislation that takes account of most of 
the practises that are internationally seen to be harmful to competition and thus, 
harmful to an effective market. However, since China is an autocratically run 
economy the question arises as to whether the implementation of the AML is a step 
forward to liberalise the economy or whether China only wants to gain greater 
acceptance in the world, especially by the developed nations that have competition 
laws in place. The following analysis will try to show whether China has only put the 
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CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 55 OF THE CHINESE ANTI- 
MONOPOLY LAW 
The AML is the first legislation in the People’s Republic of China dealing with 
competition and constitutes the first legislation that connects intellectual property 
rights and anti- monopoly law in China.
157
 As discussed in the previous chapter the 
new Chinese AML contains one clause dealing with intellectual property rights and 
the relationship to anti- monopoly law. Given that the law does not say anything 
about the application to foreign companies it can be assumed that the law is 
applicable to both national and international or foreign enterprises inside and outside 
of the Chinese territory as long as it restricts or eliminates competition on the 
Chinese market in any possible way.
158
 Intellectual property rights are dealt with in 
Article 55 AML. The meaning of Article 55 AML as well as the problems resulting 
from it will be discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. 
I. Understanding and Applying Article 55 AML 
Whereas the other prohibitions
159
 contained in the anti- monopoly legislation are 
dealt with in chapter two to chapter four, Article 55 AML is part of the 
supplementary provisions set out in chapter eight. This clause specifically deals with 
the exception of intellectual property right holders to the application of Article 55 
AML in the following manner: 
‘This law is not applicable to conducts by undertakings to implement 
their intellectual property rights in according with relevant IP laws and 
administrative regulations; however, this law is applicable to the conduct 





This clause points out that intellectual property rights can act as an exception to the 
rules set out in the foregoing articles by not applying the anti- monopoly rules to 
persons or companies that are exercising their intellectual property rights in a 
legitimate way. Article 55 AML contains two important aspects which need to be 
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discussed in further detail. First, by looking at the phrasing of the clause it appears 
evident that the legislation concerning intellectual property rights is of equal status to 
the AML.
161
 This means, in effect, that neither law can claim superiority over the 
other, which leads back to the relationship of intellectual property law and 
competition laws discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis and further emphasises that a 
balance between the two areas of law has to be established.
 162
 Thus, the AML is not 
used to interpret intellectual property laws in any way and vice versa.
163
  
The fact that the Chinese legislator appears to have intended to allow for the 
two laws to stand separate to one another is further illustrated by Article 13(4) and 
Article 15(1) AML. The former deals with the prohibition of ‘restricting the purchase 
of new technology’ and the latter makes an exception for the purpose of 
improvement and innovation.
164
  The second aspect regarding Article 55 AML which 
has to be emphasized is that Article 55 AML actually is applicable once an 
intellectual property right holder abuses its rights granted by the intellectual property 
legislation
165
; here the question arises how an abuse of intellectual property rights 
according to Article 55 AML can be defined.
166
 
Furthermore, the specifications that Article 55 AML sets will be analysed. 
For a person to be exempted from the application of the AML certain requirements 
need to be fulfilled. First, the person asking for an exemption needs to be ‘legally 
authorized’ to exercise intellectual property rights which means that taking patents as 
an example he/ she is the inventor of a certain good or he/ she has acquired the rights 
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by assignment or license from the inventor
167
; also, in order to exercise rights under a 
patent the patent must not have expired yet given that once a patent has lapsed the 
former owner thereof cannot rely on the rights anymore.
168
 Moreover, business 





 for an intellectual property right (patents or trade marks) or 
in the example of copyright have not fulfilled the requirements for copyright 
protection
171
. Secondly, and most importantly, the patent right holder’s conduct 
needs to be within the ambit of the intellectual property right laws.
172
 If for example 
a patentee acts outside his/ her rights granted by the Patent Law or uses its power to 
distort the market no protection will be given anymore under the intellectual property 




Article 55 AML does not define when a certain intellectual property right will 
be abused in the meaning of this clause and no examples have been provided in the 
legislation. The complex uncertainties of Article 55 AML will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
II. Ambiguity and Uncertainties in the Law 
The major problem with the new competition law, in particular the clause relating to 
intellectual property right holders, is that the text of Article 55 AML does not give 
any further information as to what situations it shall be applied. Questions such as 
‘When is an intellectual property right holder abusing his/ her monopolistic 
position?’ or ‘When is the conduct of a monopolist too harmful to competition on the 
market so that for the purpose of maintaining an efficient market economy the anti- 
monopoly law has to be applied?’ arise. The problem can be further illustrated by 
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taking a patent as an example of an intellectual property right and trying to analyse 
the rights and duties of patentees in order to find the scope of a monopoly granted to 
one undertaking by a patent. Article 11 of the Patent Law states that:  
‘after the patent right is granted for an invention or a utility model, 
unless otherwise provided for in this Law, no unit or individual may 
exploit the patent without permission of the patentee, i.e., it or he may 
not, for production or business purposes, manufacture, use, offer to sell, 
sell, or import the patented products, use the patented method, or use, 
offer to sell, sell or import the products that are developed directly 
through the use of the patented method’.
174
 
This clause shows that a patentee can exploit its granted rights fully and prevent 
other companies who might be possible competitors from using his/ her creation. A 
patent right holder has the exclusive rights over a certain technology and can, for 
example, set prices or set up sales conditions which objectively could be seen as anti- 
competitive and would not be allowed under Article 17(1) AML.
175
 However, patent 
law gives the right holders the ability to recoup their investment costs by excluding 
others from, for example, using the same technology. The economic profits they gain 
from the market due to this protection are intended to incentivise to further research 
and development and will eventually result in goods of equal or better quality at a 
lower price.
176
 Therefore, the price setting in the example can be seen as legitimate 
under the AML because it directly links to the patented product itself and is one of 
the rights obtained via patent protection. 
 However, concerning patent rights it is questionable when such a 
monopolistic behaviour amounts to conduct that is distorting the market and in the 
long term harmful to the unified goals of intellectual property law and competition 
law of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.
177
 As previously 
discussed, a good balance has to be established between the existing intellectual 
property rights and the antimonopoly law.
178
 The conduct of a patentee can bring 
about certain limitations on the market which could be disadvantageous to the 
competition taking place but still be tolerated because of the objectives of patent law 
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and the actual benefits such a protection has.
179
 One example illustrating this 
scenario is the negotiation of a patentee with his/ her prospective licensee about the 
ambit of the license regarding the area of use, the type of rights and the duration of 
the license; such acts – in the eyes of competition – are not harmful and are possible 
exceptions to the application of the AML.
180
  A counter-example is the exercise of 
product- tying when a company links its patented product to a product with no patent 
protection; here, Article 17(5) AML is most likely to be applied because that conduct 
might distort the competition on the market and lead to unfair advantages of one 
competitor to the other.
181
 One example to illustrate tying is the Microsoft Case in 
which Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player to the Windows operating system 
and the European Court of First Instance affirmed the Commission’s decision by 
ruling that this conduct lead to a foreclosure of the market.
182
 
In defining the term ‘abuse’ in Article 55 AML regard might be drawn to 
international frameworks. Since the People’s Republic of China joined the WTO in 
2001, it now has to comply with all the agreements binding the members of the 
WTO.
183
 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis China’s intellectual property laws 
have to comply with TRIPS, the agreement relating to the intellectual property rights 
in the member states.
 
In Article 40(2) TRIPS it is stipulated that:  
‘Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in 
their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular 
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, 
a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this 
Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, 
which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, 
conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package 
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This Article could be used to assist interpreting the meaning of intellectual 
property abuse in Article 55 AML.
185
 At the WTO Council in October 2007 China 
was questioned by the European Union as to how ‘abuse intellectual property rights’ 
should be defined and whether the Chinese understanding goes beyond the scope set 
out in Article 40(2) TRIPS.
186
 In TRIPS, abusive conduct is understood to include 
exclusive grantbacks which means that a licensee has to assign all the rights to the 
grantor if a patented technology is improved in any way or a new technology 
invented while using the patented technology.
187
 Also, TRIPS sees the prevention of 
challenging the validity of an intellectual property right as abusive which means that 
for example the grantor of a patent cannot stipulate a clause in the contract 
forbidding the licensee to challenge the patent’s validity.
188
 Last, Article 40(2) 
TRIPS states ‘coercive package licensing’ as an abuse which is u derstood to be the 
situation when a patent can only be used once other patents are licensed as well but 
the grantor forces the licensee to also obtain licenses for patents the licensee does not 
necessarily need which puts a huge burden on the licensee because he/ she has to pay 
royalties for a license of a patent that will not be used.
189
 Since the AML does not 
contain information regarding these conditions it remains highly ambiguous as to 
what conduct constitutes an abuse of intellectual property rights. 
Moreover, consideration should be given to other Chinese domestic 
legislation. It can be used to assist with the interpretation of Article 55 AML and the 
meaning of ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’. First, the Foreign Trade Law can 
help to interpret the competition law because Article 30 and Article 32 mirror the 
stipulations of TRIPS and also declare exclusive grantbacks, the prohibition of 
challenging the validity and coercive package licensing as abuse and prohibit the 
illegal creation of monopolies.
190
 Secondly, regards may be drawn to the Contract 
Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 329 of the Contract Law stipulates 
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that a contract dealing with technology (‘technology contract’) is void if it creates an 
illegal monopoly, hinders the development of technology or harms the rights to a 
technology of a third person.
191
 Article 343 of the Contract Law deals with 
technology transfer contracts allowing the transferor and transferee to set up rules 
concerning the exploitation of a patent to the limit that competition and development 
of technology will not be restricted.
192
 These two articles could be used for defining 
the abuse in the meaning of Article 55 AML as they declare contracts void that lead 
to illegal monopolies and as a result of that cause a restriction of competition on the 
technology market.
193
 Article 10 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court 
concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes 
over Technology Contract further clarifies Article 329 of the Contract Law by listing 
six conditions as to when an illegal monopoly impedes the technological progress: 
first, a contract must not restrict another’s technological improvement and therefore 
conditions such as exclusive grantbacks or sole-ownership of jointly developed 
technology are prohibited; secondly, the other party must not be restricted to obtain 
technology from other sources in order to compete; thirdly, the transferor must not 
hinder the transferees exploitation of the market; fourthly, the technology recipient 
cannot be contractually forced to also obtain raw materials and other equipment from 
the transferor; fifthly, the transferee cannot restrict the sources of obtaining raw 
materials and equipment; last, he transferee cannot prohibit the recipient to 
challenge the validity of the intellectual property rights in any way.
194
 Sales 
involving ties or unreasonable conditions for a buyer are prohibited by Article 12 of 
the Law Against Unfair Competition when they are contrary to the will of the buyer; 
this article could also act as an indicator as to when a conduct is abusive.
195
 All these 
different international and domestic laws can assist with interpreting Article 55 AML 
and give some ideas by what conduct intellectual property rights are abused by the 
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holder. However, none of these laws define at what point the competition will be 
seen as eliminated or restricted.
196
 
 Another ambiguity of Article 55 AML is that it does not provide any 
information concerning the size of the firm. It is questionable whether a company has 
to have a dominant position on the relevant market in order for the AML to apply to 
that undertaking or whether is it applicable to any undertaking regardless of the size 
and market position.
197
 This ambiguity raises a lot of concern because no firm can be 
sure if the rules of Article 55 AML will be applied to them or not. The AML deals 
with the definition of dominance in Article 18 AML and names market shares and 
the ability to control as possible ways to determine dominance on the market. Article 
19 AML sets out the market power thresholds that should be applied.
198
 However, in 
a court action enterprises are encouraged to bring forward the ‘non- dominant firm 
defence’ and argue that the conduct, even though it might be anti- competitive, will 
not lead to a distortion of competition or result in a harmful effect on the market 
because the market share of the firm is relatively small. 
 A further problem occurring with the pplication of Article 55 AML is the 
uncertainty of the administrative liability of undertakings that breach Article 55 
AML by abusing their intellectual property rights. The legal liabilities of 
undertakings infringing the rules of the AML are laid down in Article 47 to Article 
54 AML including monetary penalties and orders to stop certain conduct. However, 
it needs to be noted that the legal liabilities are placed before Article 55 AML and 
therefore it is questionable if they will also be applied to the abuse of intellectual 
property rights when there is no dominant position at question.
199
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As it can be seen from the previous discussion it is very unclear what kind of conduct 
amounts to an ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ in the meaning of Article 55 
AML. Some experts see Article 55 AML as highly ‘controversial’.
200
 This is a very 
risky situation, especially for foreign firms. Their behaviour on the market including 
exercises such as refusing licenses, obtaining a monopoly through a patent or 
limiting competition by ways of good branding, could – in the eyes of a Chinese 
judge – amount to abusing behaviour and hence, could result in the application of the 
AML.
201
 Trials are very burdensome because they cost a lot of money and usually 
take up a lot of time. In order to prevent a trial the firms need to know what conduct 
is legal or illegal so they can plan their exercises carefully to avoid law suits. 
The enforcement of the AML remains very unclear and concerns arise. It still 
remains unclear, for example, which authority is responsible for the enforcement. 
Article 10 AML only stipulates that the State Council has the duty to ensure that the 
enforcement is consistent with the regulations stipulated in the AML.
202
 The 
multinational corporations (MNCs) doing business in the People’s Republic of China 
also fear the uncertainty how the AML will be interpreted and enforced. Foreign 
companies or MNCs are afraid that the law might be enforced more strictly on them, 
than on competing Chinese companies.
203
 The antimonopoly enforcers, namely 
MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC
204
, could be influenced by political opinions or 
‘ideological beliefs’.
205
 Especially in the People’s Republic of China it can be 
suspected that the enforcement of the competition law is and will be influenced 
substantially by political opinions and the socialist ideology because of the ‘stronger 
nationalistic sensibility’ and the importance of national security; this could for 
example result in state owned enterprises (SOEs) being exempted on grounds of 
Article 55 AML although they are substantially restricting competition whereas 
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MNCs could be held liable for the same conduct and be tried in the courts.
206
 SOEs 
are corporations that are established by the local or national government to get 
involved in commercial activities.
207
 Another possible scenario could be that MNCs 
are pressured to establish business relations to SOEs by the way of compulsory 
licensing or the like.
208
 This is a major concern to the MNCs because they will have 
to disclose their technology to the SOEs which could lead to unwanted dissemination 
of the information and to the weakening of the rights granted under intellectual 
property legislation. 
Another possible scenario is that intellectual property right holders in China 
are at risk of being accused of abusing their monopolistic position on the market 
even though in some other countries their conduct would be seen as legitimate and in 
conformity with the existing intellectual property legislation.
209
 This will result in the 
forfeiture of the rights granted by the intellectual property legislation and will often 
have negative monetary outcomes for the affected company.
210
 This fact was further 
emphasized by Wu Zhenguo, the deputy director at the MOFCOM office responsible 
for antimonopoly concerns, who stated that business exercises of firms could be seen 




However, there are certain factors that speak against the ‘misuse of the AML’ 
and could diminish the fears of the foreign companies.
212
 Article 7 AML deals with 
the so- called SOEs and it can be assumed such enterprises are excluded from the 
application of the AML which shows that foreign companies do not have to fear 
potential inequalities concerning the enforcement because the SOEs are already 
excluded from the AML; but it remains unclear which kind of SOEs are excluded 
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and if for example the industries combining SOEs as well as non- SOEs are subject 
to the AML.
213
 Furthermore, another aspect which could decrease the fear is the fact 
that many enforcers could be more stimulated by their careers and aim at the correct 
enforcement to improve their reputation.
214
 
However, since the AML does not give more information to the above 
discussed problems, its application remains unclear to everyone and the fear of 
misuse, inequalities and different interpretation remains. All the uncertainties could 
actually result in less investment and research and innovation in China.
215
 
IV. Article 15 AML 
Article 15 AML provides an exemption to the application of Article 13 and Article 
14 AML that prohibit monopolistic agreements that can harm the competition in the 
internal market of the People’s Republic of China. On the basis of Article 15 AML 
monopolistic agreements can be exempted from the application of the AML if 
research and development is enhanced by the agreement and technology will be 
improved.
216
 A very important aspect is that the exemption provision of Article 15 
AML is not applicable to dominant firms but only to the monopolistic agreements 
situations that are located before Article 15 AML. This exemption provision could 
especially work for agreements on technology licensing and could therefore benefit 
intellectual property right holders but it remains unclear as to when such an 
exemption situation exists because the article is very simplified.
217
 It is suggested 
that enterprises use Article 15(i) AML as a defence in a court action. 
V. Guidelines, Regulations or Judicial Interpretations 
The People’s Republic of China mainly adopted the civil law system meaning that 
the legislation enacted by the state is the main source of law. However, the codified 
laws cannot be understood to be the exclusive source of law applied by the judicature 
when deciding legal problems because it is impossible to think of all the questions 
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that may arise at the time the law is drafted.
218
 Moreover, the ambiguity and 
inaccuracy of language can lead to many different interpretations.
219
 The People’s 
Republic of China has been known for drafting the laws broadly in order to shape it 
further with regulations, administrative rules or judicial interpretations.
220
 Therefore, 
the law itself cannot possibly be the sole source. Guidelines, regulations or judicial 
interpretations are needed to assist in applying the codified law.
221
 
 Looking at the AML, regulations or guidelines could bring some light into the 
ambiguities and uncertainties of legislation, especially to the controversy of Article 
55 AML. The AML is effective since 2008 and it needs to be analysed whether 
regulations have been published that assist in understanding the more complicated 
clauses of the legislation and decrease the fear of the intellectual property right 
holders. In May 2012 the Supreme People’s Court of China announced the 
‘Regulations on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law in the Trial of Civil 
Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conducts’, which constitutes the first interpretation 
by the judicial body since the AML took effect in 2008.
222
 Unfortunately, the judicial 
interpretation does not say anything about the complexities of Article 55 AML and 
mainly deals with the problems of the burden of proof, the eligible plaintiff, the 
jurisdiction and the scope of remedies.
223
 Some other guidelines and regulations have 
been issued by the NDRC, SAIC and the State Council but none have touched the 
interpretation of Article 55 AML yet.
224
 
Currently, the SAIC, an organisation directly under the State Council, is busy 
drafting guidelines for the application of Article 55 AML and the intersection of 
intellectual property rights and the AML. Discussions concerning the fifth draft of 
these guidelines were dealt with by the State Council on 14 August 2012.
225
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Unfortunately, all the drafts, including the latest of 2012, are not published yet. 
However, there is a report by the legal reporter Wei Zhang dealing with the core 
issues concerning intellectual property law and antitrust that will be further clarified 
by the guidelines that are supposed to take effect sometime this year.
226
 The draft 
contains four main aspects namely regulations regarding the refusal to license
227
, 
regulations about the conditions that can be placed upon business partners
228
, 
regulations concerning conspiracy agreements between operators
229
 and general 





1. Prohibition of Discriminatory Refusal to License 
Unconditional unilateral refusal to license that is not discriminatory will usually not 
be regarded as abuse in the meaning of Article 55 AML because the anti- monopoly 
law does not force market operators to engage with others; however, the report 
stipulates some conditions that will amount to an abuse of intellectual property 
rights: first, the refusal to license will be seen as discriminatory and unfair when the 
operator holds a dominant position on the market (compare to Article 17(3) AML); 
secondly, the refusal is discriminatory if the licensee is depending on obtaining a 
license in order to be able to participate in the market competition (essential facility); 
thirdly, the refusal is prohibited when the supposed licensee cannot compete 
effectively because of the refusal and fourthly, the conduct is prohibited when it 
leads to an adverse impact on innovation competition and the legitimate interests of 
the consumers cannot be met anymore.
232
  
2. Prohibition of Additional Conditions Contrary to the Will of the Other 
Moreover, the guidelines will stipulate that a market operator cannot place conditions 
onto the licensee if they are contrary to his/ her will: first, exclusive grantback 
clauses are prohibited; secondly, the grantor cannot forbid the licensee to challenge 
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the validity of the intellectual property right in question and thirdly, it is seen as an 
abuse when limitations are put on the licensee concerning the manufacture, use, sale 
of competing goods or competing technologies after a license has expired as well as 
other unreasonable trading conditions.
233
 
Furthermore, the guidelines will set out that ‘tying practices’ are unreasonable, 
especially when the intellectual property right holder has a dominant position on the 
market of the tying product, the two tied products belong to different trading habits, 
the tying has a substantial impact on the market of the tying product and the 
dominance of the intellectual property right holder in the tying product market 




3. Prohibition of Conspiratorial Agreements between Operators 
The guidelines will further clarify as to which conduct amounts to a conspiratorial 
agreement between competitors and therefore constitutes an abuse of intellectual 
property rights which lead to the distortion of competition. First, the fixing of license 
fees and sales prices concerning intellectual property goods between competitors is 
prohibited; secondly, the limiting of licenses and the limiting of production and sales 
volume are seen as conspiratorial and therefore abusive;  thirdly, dividing the 
concerned markets of the intellectual good as well as the raw material market 
between competitors is prohibited; fourthly, an agreement about the restriction of 
purchase and development of new technology is not allowed; last the guidelines will 
state that the joint refusal to license as well as the joint refusal to sell intellectual 
property goods to a particular market operator amounts to an abuse in the meaning of 
the anti- monopoly law.
235
 
 Furthermore, the guidelines will stipulate that a restriction of resale to a third 
person or fixing resale prices to a third person will also not be tolerated under the 
competition law in an agreement of two parties when TRIPS is applicable.
236
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4. The Emphasis is put on the Examination of whether Competition is 
restricted 
Concerning the requirement of the restriction or distortion of competition, the 
guidelines will set out the following rules to be applied by the anti- monopoly 
enforcement agencies: first of all, the behaviour of the legal entity concerning an 
intellectual property right has to be analysed; secondly, the nature of the relationship 
between the operators has to be analysed; thirdly, the intellectual property goods are 
used to define the relevant product market; fourthly, the market power of the 
operator has to be established; then, the behaviour of everyone on that specific 
product market has to be analysed (impact on the competition); last, the negative 
impact on the competition has to be weighed against the positive effects of 
intellectual property law and it needs to be established which effect is greater and 
will result in an improvement on the market in the long term – in other words, is the 
beneficial impact of a certain conduct from an operator greater than negative impact 
on competition so that a restriction of competition can be tolerated in some way?
237
 
In summary and in order to ascertain the impact on competition, the enforcement 
agencies have to take into account the exercise of the intellectual property rights of 
both the holder and the competitors, the position on the market, the degree of 
concentration in the relevant market, the industry practices and the industrial 
development, the effectiveness and scope of restriction and the exercise of 
intellectual property rights to promote innovation and new technologies including the 
rapidness of technological change.
238
 
5. Interim Summary 
The fifth draft of the guidelines dealing with the interface of intellectual property law 
and competition law, namely Article 55 AML, is the first legal document about this 
problem since the enactment of the law in August 2008 and will finally give some 
information and assistance concerning the interpretation and application of Article 55 
AML. As is evident considering the previous discussion of Article 40(2) TRIPS it is 
notable that the guidelines will contain similar provisions because the proposed 
guidelines also see exclusive grantback licensing as well as the restriction of a 
licensee to challenge an intellectual property rights validity as an abuse of 
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intellectual property law and declare the anti- monopoly law applicable in such 
situations. The guidelines clearly declare tying to be unreasonable and hence illegal 
and discuss the different refusals to license in detail to give a clear impression when 
a refusal amounts to abuse because the mere refusal itself is usually not restricting 
competition. In summary it can be said that the drafted guidelines deal with the major 
problem of understanding how intellectual property rights and competition shall be 
understood and balanced with each other and they are much needed. The enactment 
of these guidelines is long- awaited and will bring about a change in understanding 
and interpreting Article 55 AML. 
6. Nature of the Future Guidelines 
The guidelines on the application of the AML will most likely be of a binding nature 
because they are drafted by the SAIC, a ministerial organisation directly under the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China.
239
 The State Council, or also the 
central government, is both the highest executive organ as well as the highest 
administrative organ in China.
240
 Therefore it can be presumed that the guidelines 
will be binding to the enforcement institutions. 
VI. Summary 
Summarizing the whole analysis it can be said that Article 55 AML is a first step 
towards finding a balance between intellectual property rights and anti- monopoly 
law in the People’s Republic of China but further interpretations in the way of 
regulations, guidelines, case law or judicial interpretation are necessary to understand 
how the law will be enforced and what the intellectual property right holders have to 
expect by the enforcement agencies of the AML. The international and domestic 
legislation dealing with the abuse of intellectual property rights can be used as a 
guidance but intellectual property right holders cannot rely on them to predict the 
outcome of a court trial. 
                                                 
239
 SAIC ‘About Us – Mission’ available at http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/, 
accessed on 8 June 2013. 
240
 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China ‘State Council’ available at 












CHAPTER 4 – COMPARISON TO THE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Since the AML is still very new there are no published cases concerning the interface 
of competition and intellectual property in China yet. Other ways need to be found to 
analyse the possible outcome of competition cases in the Chinese jurisdiction. In 
order to be able to predict how anti- monopoly cases including intellectual property 
right holders will be dealt with in the future this thesis will look at other more 
experienced legal systems and their understanding of the relationship between 
competition law and intellectual property law. Both the approach of the European 
Union as well as the system in the United States can be taken into consideration. 
I. Reasons for the Comparison  
The European Union system, in particular, can be used to predict possible outcomes 
because – as it was analysed earlier
241
 – the Chinese AML have adopted a similar 
structure to the competition rules of the European Union as the latter served as a role 
model.
242
  In 2001 the European Union and the People’s Republic of China signed a 
declaration that majorly dealt with the competition policies in both jurisdictions; 
following that a lot of discussions on that particular topic took place and the 
European authorities shared their experience in the competition enforcement with 
Chinese partners.
243
 Moreover, a permanent European- China Competition Dialogue 
was established in 2004 which aims at giving some technical assistance to China’s 
development of a competition policy.
244
 In 2011 China and the United States also 
signed a memorandum which pursues the aim of establishing a dialogue between 
Chinese and United States competition authorities to offer assistance.
245
 Both 
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Both the European Union and the United States have a longer history of 
antitrust laws and enforcement and their dealing with the interface of both 
competition and intellectual property law could act as possible ‘signposts’ for the 
anti- monopoly cases in China.  
Business operators can deal with each other in several ways and many 
different forms of agreements; some can be about intellectual property rights 
exclusively and others may include intellectual property rights under auxiliary 
conditions only.
247
 The two main activities dealing with intellectual property rights 
concern the granting of licenses and the assignment. Granting a license means that 
another competitor can use the intellectual property (subject to the terms of the 
license) and assigning a right means that the new holder of the right can exploit it 
fully.
248
 For the purpose of in- depth analysis this thesis will concentrate on the 
issues that arise in relation to competition law around the licensing of intellectual 
property rights, especially technology transfer agreements, in both the European 
Union and the United States. 
II. The System in the European Union – Block Exemptions 
1. Competition Rules in the European Union 
European Union competition law strives to ensure effective competition within the 
single market that comprises the European Union Member States, and aims at 
decreasing barriers of transnational trade by ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources.
249
 As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the objectives of intellectual 
property law and competition law seem completely adverse at first sight but 
nevertheless they share the same long term goal of enhancing development and 
consumer welfare.
250
 Therefore, intellectual property rights cannot be understood to 
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be anti- competitive in nature. However, certain conduct of the licensor in relation to 
his/ her intellectual property rights could lead to an anti- competitive effect in the 




 The competition law of the European Union is embedded in the Treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union
252
, namely Article 3(b), Article 101 and Article 
102 TFEU. Article 3(b) TFEU gives the sole power of establishing competition rules 
to ensure a working market economy to the European Union. Article 101 TFEU 
deals with anti- competitive agreements, that could involve intellectual property 
rights by ways of licensing and Article 102 TFEU that deals with the abuse of 
dominance. An ‘undertaking’ in the meaning of these two articles is understood in a 
broad sense as an entity of any legal form that is involved in economic activity of 
some form.
253
 Because licensing is one of the most important actions when dealing 
with intellectual property rights Article 101 TFEU is the main legislation concerning 
the interface of competition law and intellectual property rights because it deals with 
agreements between competitors. However, when an intellectual property right 
holder has a dominant position on the market Article 102 TFEU claims can also be 
raised. Article 105 TFEU states that the enforcement authority of European Union 
competition rules lies with the European Commission. This concept will be further 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 As it can be seen the structure of the European Union competition rules is 
very similar to the provisions in the Chinese AML. In Chapter 2 the AML is 
concerned with monopolistic agreements (in the European Union ‘anti- competitive 
agreements’) whereas Chapter 3 deals with the abuse of a dominant market position. 
2. Application of the Competition Legislation – Guidelines and Rules 
Unlike the Chinese AML, the articles in the TFEU dealing with competition do not 
contain any information about the relationship between competition law and 
intellectual property rights. An important case in the history of competition law in 
the European Union is the case of Consten and Grundig, which dealt with the 
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problem of parallel imports and the restriction thereof.
254
 Grundig was a 
manufacturer of electronic goods in Germany and granted an exclusive distribution 
right of its products to Consten, a French distributor. The agreement of the two 
undertakings stipulated that Consten was the only distributor in France (Grundig 
could not appoint other distributors), Consten consented to obtain minimum 
quantities and was prohibited to sell products from Grundig’s competitors or to sell 
Grundig products outside the French territory, in return Consten obtained the right to 
register Grundig’s trade mark ‘GINT’ and by that could prevent other market 
operators to sell these goods. Following that, Consten sued an unauthorized seller of 
these products in France but the Commission and the European Court of Justice 
decided that the agreement between Consten and Grundig was anti- competitive in 
nature because the registration of the trade mark in France was for the sole purpose 
of preventing parallel imports and thereby restricting competition which made 
Article 101(1) TFEU (ex Article 81 EC Treaty) applicable.
255
 This case gives some 
information as to how intellectual property rights are dealt with in the European 
Union. Through the following analysis of European competition law and intellectual 
property law this thesis will focus on the existence of guidelines and regulations that 
deal with this controversial area and it will be analysed if the existing regulations 
could help the People’s Republic of China or give some guidance in structuring their 
guidelines accordingly. 
For the analysis of the application and guidelines it will be distinguished between 
Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU. 
a) Article 101 TFEU 
Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements or concerted practises that can harm trade 
between the Member States of the European Union and lead to an anti-competitive 
impact on the internal market by distorting, restricting or preventing competition. In 
the Bayer Adalat
256
 case the European Court of Justice ruled that for an agreement or 
a concerted practise to exist a ‘concurrence of wills’ needs to be present. Moreover, 
the application of Article 101(1) TFEU demands an ‘appreciable effect’ on the 
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market and for that reason the Commission issued a notice that excludes agreements 




1) Restrictions of Article 101(1) TFEU 
Many conditions found in intellectual property license agreements such as restricting 
prices or consumers, tying products or prohibiting exports in the eyes of the 




The restriction of prices or so-called ‘resale price maintenance’ is prohibited 
by Article 101(1)(a) TFEU and is seen as very anti- competitive conduct. A grantor 
fixes prices if the license agreement contains a clause about maintaining a specified 
fixed or minimum price
259
; recommendations or fixed maximum prices are not seen 
as anti- competitive. Restricting the class of customers is generally not seen as 
harming competition unless passive restrictions are placed upon the licensee as well 
meaning that customers cannot be prohibited to buy their goods outside a specific 
group of customers; however, the licensee can be restricted to actively promote the 
goods outside a specific group.
260
 This provision can be compared to Article 13(i) 
AML which prohibits the fixation or change of product prices between market 
operators. Thus, guidelines on these situations could help to predict the outcome of 
price fixing cases in the People’s Republic of China.  
 Moreover, the European Union sees the tying of an intellectual property good 
to another good as potential harm to competition.
261
 Tying of licenses occurs when 
the licensor requires the licensee to purchase also another license in order to acquire 
the desired license. Article 101 TFEU might be applicable when two competitors 
agree to such practises and competition is restricted by that. However, vertical 
agreements can be exempted under the requirements of the Vertical Agreements 
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 The exemptions will be discussed further in the next 
section. In cases concerning safety issues or technology improvement tying 
agreements might be seen as increasing market efficiency and hence, would not be 
restricted by Article 101 TFEU.
263
  As discussed above, product tying will also be 
seen to be anti- competitive and thus prohibited under the AML and the proposed 
guidelines of the State Council in the People’s Republic of China. This again shows 
that the Chinese legislators have a similar understanding of harmful practises that are 
likely to distort competition. 
 Export bans are generally understood as clauses that restrict the licensee to 
sell the goods outside its allotted territory. A distinction needs to be made between 
active sales (actively marketing the products outside the territory) and passive sales 
(customers from other territories buying products from the licensee for example via 
the internet) where the former generally does not raise competition concerns whereas 
the latter is seen as anti- competitive because customers would be harmed by the lack 
of purchase sources; for such conduct no exemption can be made on terms of the 
VABE.
264
 An exception to that rule can be seen when looking at technology licenses 
and the application of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption (TTBE).
265
 In order 
to fall under the exemption of TTBE an agreement between two entities with the 
main object of licensing technology has to exist. The TTBE will be discussed further 
in detail in the following paragraphs. With regard to China no further information to 
the understanding and impact of export bans exists so far. The new guidelines do not 
contain information about that practise. 
2) Exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU and Block Exemptions 
An agreement falling under Article 101(1) TFEU can be exempted on grounds of 
Article 101(3) TFEU if it  
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‘contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a 
fair share of the resulting benefit’
266
 
being subject to further conditions named in the exemption article.  If an agreement 
falls within the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU it is automatically exempted 
which means that undertakings do not have to apply for an exemption to be granted. 
This article can be compared to Article 15 AML that also exempts certain 
agreements if technology can be improved and research and development will be 
enhanced. The Commission has announced guidelines in 2004 and 2011 which 
further clarify the understanding of Article 101.
267
 In contrast to that no guidelines 
exist in China.   
 Furthermore – and more important to intellectual property rights – is the 
European Union system of block exemptions to certain kinds of agreements. This 
system has the effect of decreasing the duty of both an undertaking and the 
Commission to analyse the agreements because if the requirements stipulated in a 
block exemption regulation are met the agreement automatically falls outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.
268
 Exemptions are for the purpose of preventing an 
overload of cases and try to bring more transparency into the application of the 
European Union competition rules. Concerning intellectual property rights, the 
Commission’s TTBE of 2004 becomes important which has the purpose of 
maintaining competition on the internal market and gives legal certainty to the 
entities active in the European Union.
269
 Patents, software copyrights and know- how 
licenses and assignments are exempted from Article 101(1) TFEU if the conditions 
stipulated in the TTBE are met which include but are not limited to the market shares 
(less than twenty per cent combined concerning competitors, less than thirty per cent 
combined concerning non- competitors) and the prohibition of hardcore restrictions 
as stated in detail in Article 4 TTBE. Article 5 TTBE contains some restrictions 
which are generally not understood to be anti-competitive but further case-to-case 
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 Also, the Commission has issued guidelines that further clarify 
the application of the block exemption.
271
 The guidelines are a very useful source to 
understand the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to technology transfer agreements 
and also contain some information on the application of Article 101 TFEU to 
agreements that do not fit into the requirements of the block exemption.
272
 
Moreover, there is the VABE which exempts all agreements between entities of 
different economic levels if the market share of the supplier does not exceed thirty 
per cent or the buyer’s share on the market where the goods are bought does not 
exceed thirty per cent. Intellectual property licensing agreements are caught by this 
exemption if the license is not the main purpose of the agreement, the intellectual 
property is linked to using, selling or reselling the good and the agreement does not 
have the aim to restrict competition by means of the vertical restraints that are 
stipulated in the VABE.
273
 
The regulations issued by the Commission or the Council have binding force.
274
 
Guidelines and notices by the Commission are seen as so- called ‘soft law’ and 
influence the analysis of competition law by providing guidance.
275
 However, they 




This approach to the interface of competition law and intellectual property law by 
the way of block exemptions could provide useful guidance to the Chinese anti- 
monopoly enforcement agencies. Exemptions are a good way to avoid an overload of 
work for the enforcement agencies and courts so that they can focus on the conduct 
of competitors that is more harmful to competition and will result in a distortion of 
the market. Moreover, undertakings can predict what to expect from the competition 
authorities and plan their businesses accordingly. Moreover, a competition system in 
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a dynamic intellectual property market needs to be flexible and only evaluate and 
control the behaviour of competitors that notionally can be anti- competitive.  
b) Article 102 TFEU 
Article 102 TFEU deals with the abuse of a dominant position and does not contain a 
similar exemption provision as Article 101(1) TFEU. An undertaking is seen to be 
dominant when it can act independently on the market and can by certain conduct 
distort competition; this usually occurs when an entity has a market share of more 
than forty per cent but can also occur between shares of twenty- five per cent to forty 
per cent based on individual cases.
277
 Abusive conduct includes but is not limited to 
practises such as price fixing, discriminatory activities and limitations to technical 
development or markets. Regarding intellectual property right holders with a 
dominant position, abusive conduct can occur in several cases such as exclusive 
licensing that is restricting competition or demanding usuri us royalty fees from the 
licensees. Moreover, the tying by a dominant firm is seen as abusive and therefore 
falls within Article 102 TFEU.
278
 The European Court of Justice has established an 
important test for the evaluation whether the refusal to license amounts to an abuse in 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, namely the ‘exceptional circumstance’ test.
279
 The 
test regards a refusal as abusive if the technology in question is essential for 
competition taking place on that market and the licensee intends to sell a product 
using that technology which the licensor does not sell. Following that a refusal to 
license the technology without objective justification results in the creation of a 
dominant position of the licensor in a secondary product market.
280
 The ‘exceptional 
circumstance’ test can be compared to the rules stated in the proposed Chinese 
guidelines concerning prohibition of discriminatory refusals to license where a 
refusal is regarded as anti- competitive if other undertakings are dependent on the 
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dominant undertaking and without the license cannot take part in the competition on 
the market anymore (essential facility).
281
 
c) Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine 
Another principle dealing with the relationship between intellectual property rights 
and competition law in the European Union is the Doctrine of the Exhaustion of 
Rights which means that an intellectual property right holder cannot prevent export 
to other European Economic Area States once he/ she has placed the product on the 
market in a Member State.
282
 In order to understand the meaning of the doctrine the 
existence of intellectual property rights and the exercise thereof need to be 
established.
283
 This concept was first established in two European cases.
284
 The 
undertaking in questions needs to be a holder of intellectual property rights and 
furthermore the intellectual property goods need to be placed on the market in one of 
the Member States. 
III. The Model in the United States – Rule of Reason 
1. Antitrust Rules in the United States 
In the United States the competition law or better called antitrust law takes a 
different approach to coping with the problems occurring between intellectual 
property laws and antitrust law than in the European Union. The United States follow 
a common law system and rely on precedent cases. However, the legislature – the 
Congress –  has enacted statutes, called ‘acts’ in the United States, for the areas of 
intellectual property law and antitrust law. The antitrust laws of the United States 
aim at stimulating a market that is accessible to everyone by preventing exclusionary 
behaviour of the entities that could be harmful to the competition.
285
 
                                                 
281
 W Zhang ‘知识产权领域反垄断将出执法指南’ SIPO (16 August 2012) op cit. 
282
 This Doctrine has been confirmed by many cases of the ECJ: i.e. Deutsche Grammophon 
Gesellschaft mbH v Metro- SB-Grossmaerkte GmbH & Co KG (1971) Case 78/70 EC 487; 
Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc. (1974) Case 15/74 ECR 1147; Sebago Inc. 
and Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA (1999) Case 173/98 ECR I-04103. 
283
 MM Dabbah EC and UK Competition Law – Commentary, Cases and Materials (2004) 202. 
284
 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European 
Economic Community 13 July 1966 Joined cases 56 and 58-64 and Deutsche Grammophon 
Gesellschaft mbH v Metro- SB-Grossmaerkte GmbH & Co KG (1971) Case 78/70 EC 487. 
285
 SE Foster & SR Alfonso & BJ Reingold ‘Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Antitrust 
Law’ (2013) The Antitrust Review of the Americas at 16 available at 













The most important federal statutes dealing with antitrust in the United States are 
the Sherman Act
286
 and the Federal Trade Commission Act
287
 and moreover, some 
states enacted competition laws as well that mirror the rules stipulated in the federal 
acts.
288
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act
289
 sets out the restriction of agreements 
between two or more entities that have as their outcome the restriction of competition 
in an unreasonable and unjustified way. This can be compared to Chapter 2 of the 
AML. Monopolies are dealt with in Section 2 of the Sherman Act
290
 that prohibits 
deliberate creation of a monopoly, the attempt thereof and the collaboration with 
another person for the purpose of monopolizing a certain part of the market 
excluding such monopolies that grow bigger because the products are of higher 
quality, the company grew because of business competence or the branch is 
monopolized by historical reasons.
291
 In terms of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act
292
 the Commission is authorised to prevent all ‘unfair methods of 
competition’ and all ‘unfair or deceptive acts’ that can be harmful to commerce. The 
United States intellectual property laws confer an exclusive right on the intellectual 
property right holder for a limited period and hence allow him/ her to prevent others 
from using the intellectual good. In contrast to other jurisdiction the United States 
antitrust enforcement is known to bene it the intellectual property right holder.
293
 
The agencies responsible for the enforcement of antitrust are the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice that has criminal and civil enforcement 
powers, the Federal Trade Commission that can enforce the rules stipulated in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act
294
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2. Application of the Antitrust Rules 
The antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States have both used the ‘per se 
rule’ and the ‘rule of reason’ to decide upon the behaviour of entities that could 
restrict competition.
296
 Concerning the ‘per se rule’ conduct is prohibited when it is 
inherently unlawful with no further proof required and no economic justification can 
be established.
297
 For example, the courts have found intellectual property licensing 
as per se illegal for certain pricing practises and for tying of a non intellectual 
property good with an intellectual property.
298
 This can be compared to the rules 
stipulated in the draft of the proposed guidelines by the State Council in China 
because they will declare price fixing as well as tying as anti- competitive.
299
 
However, the courts have used the rule of reason for the majority of the cases 
concerning antitrust issues.
300
 The rule of reason is a preponderance of the positive 
and negative aspects of a certain conduct in order to find out whether the economic 
activity is pro- or anti- competitive.
301
 If the pro-competitive aspects outweigh the 
anti-competitive impact on the market the conduct is lawful and if the anti-
competitive part prevails the conduct is found to be illegal. 
 The comparison of the United States approach to the future guidelines in 
China is very interesting. As discussed above the new provisions will set out rules as 
to when competition is restricted according to Article 55 AML.
302
 In those guidelines 
the SAIC decided to use a similar approach to the United States system by weighing 
the positive and negative impact of competition against each other and deciding 
which effect outweighs the other in order to decide whether the entity’s conduct will 
be prohibited by the antitrust rules or not. Having identified this similarity the 
decisions in the United States might act as possible guidelines for the Chinese 
enforcement agencies and courts. 
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In 1995 the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Antitrust 
Guidelines).
303
 The guidelines provide information about the general principles of 
intellectual property and antitrust and the antitrust concerns such as the rules for 
defining the market; it also gives guidance to the enforcement agencies on the 
method of analysing the conduct and the rule of reason, rules for applying the general 
principles to the different kinds of exclusionary conduct and enforcement rules on 
invalid intellectual property rights.  
The Antitrust Guidelines are not binding on the courts and the enforcement 
agencies but they contain many analytical principles that were established in the 
precedents and show how the existing case law is applied.
304
 Section 2 of the 
Antitrust Guidelines sets out three principles that form the basis of the enforcement 
policies of the two agencies.
305
 First, intellectual property is treated in the same 
manner as any other form of property and therefore is not privileged. Secondly, the 
agencies do not make any presumption to market dominance because of an 
intellectual property right, meaning that an intellectual property right holder is not 
dominant just because of the intellectual property right. Thirdly, the agencies regard 
the licensing of intellectual property as pro- competitive in nature. Some conduct 
such as naked price- fixing and market division is seen as per se illegal but during the 
last years the enforcement of intellectual property antitrust laws has moved to the 
rule of reason approach. 
 Also, the Antitrust Guidelines provide a ‘safety zone’ which exempts certain 
licensing agreements from the application of antitrust legislation.
306
 The general two 
requirements for being in the safety zone are that the conduct is ‘not facially 
anticompetitive’ and that the joined market shares of both parties of the licensing 
agreement are not more than twenty per cent. If problems occur when examining the 
market share the alternative requirements are that the conduct is ‘not facially 
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anticompetitive’ and that four or more substitutable technologies are present on the 
market for the consumer or alternatively that four or more independent operators can 
research and develop in the substitute technology market. This ‘safety zone’ pursues 




 Furthermore, the Antitrust Guidelines state that conduct including harmful 
refusal to license, tying, cross- licensing, exclusive grantbacks and patent pooling 
agreements that fix prices or foreclose competition are generally understood to be 
anti- competitive.
308
 Again, this can be compared to the future guidelines in China 
that also declare certain discriminatory refusals to license, tying and grantbacks as 
harmful to competition and thus, prohibited.
309
 
In summary it can be said that the Antitrust Guidelines give detailed information 
of the application of the United States antitrust laws to the market operators and also 
contain several hypothetical examples that illustrate the application to make it 
understandable for the entities. The rule of reason analysis is a good way to deal with 
the complex issue of the interface of intellectual property law and antitrust as it 
balances the positive and negative outcome of the conduct and looks at the long term 
development of the competition on the internal market. Since China has also decided 
upon a balancing practise the decisions in the United States could give some 
information on how Article 55 AML will be enforced. 
b) The 2003 Report by the Federal Trade Commission 
In 2003 the Federal Trade Commission issued a Report that analyses the balance of 
antitrust – especially patent law – and intellectual property rights.
310
 The Federal 
Trade Commission emphasizes in that report that innovation is very important for the 
consumer welfare and innovation can be promoted by an effective antitrust 
intellectual property policy that motivates entities to access the market or existing 
entities to engage in more research and development.
 311
 A very important aspect that 
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was determined in the analysis by the Federal Trade Commission is that patents 
should not be awarded carelessly for every technology that seems patentable and 




c) The 2007 Report by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal State 
Commission  
Another document providing information about the intersection of intellectual 
property rights and antitrust laws in the United States is the Report on Antitrust 
Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights (2007 Report).
313
 The rule of reason 
approach of the intellectual property antitrust enforcement was again pointed out in 
the report and the Commission highlighted once more that the licensing of 
intellectual property rights, if it is used lawfully, is actually enhancing competition 
and innovation.
314
 The first and second chapters give advice on lawful licensing 
practises and the way in which companies can benefit from holding intellectual 
property rights. The third chapter focuses on the per se legal cross- licensing 
practises and patent pooling and analyses what kind of conduct amounts to antitrust 
liability. Chapter four gives some more insight into the complex issue of the rule of 
reason analysis and especially gives assistance in the evaluation of non- assertion 
clauses, grantbacks and reach- through licenses. The fifth chapter sets out the 
concerns of tying and bundling of intellectual property rights and the sixth chapter 
gives information about the practises firms engage in to protect a patent that has 
expired such as continuing to demand royalties or bundling the patent rights with 
trade secrets. 
 In comparison to the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines the 2007 Report is much 
more detailed and can be used more easily to analyse economic conduct concerning 
antitrust and intellectual property.
315
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As one can see the European Union has chosen a system of block exemption on 
certain kinds of agreements relating to intellectual property rights which proves to be 
an effective model of dealing with the problematic intersection of intellectual 
property rights and competition law. It is advisable to China to look at the system the 
European Union has established and to implement something similar or at least 
guidelines on how the AML works so that undertakings obtain legal certainty and 
can act more freely on the market in the People’s Republic of China. 
 In contrast to that the United States antitrust enforcement has approached the 
issue by subjecting conduct to the ‘rule of reasons’ analysis and thereafter, based on 
the analysis, deciding whether a conduct is mainly pro- or anti- competitive. 
However, the United States also provide a ‘safety zone’ for entities and exempt some 
agreements from antitrust liabilities based on the market share or the above discussed 
alternatives.
316
 The guidelines and reports of both the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division and the Federal Trade Commission are not binding like the guidelines and 
regulations in the European Union but nevertheless provide some detailed 
information on how an antitrust analysis is executed.
317
 
 The analysis shows how two different jurisdictions cope with the complex 
issue of intellectual property rights and competition policy and provide some 
guidance to China on how their competition law – especially Article 55 AML – 
could be applied in the future and gives some ideas on how to structure possible 
guidelines.  
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This dissertation has provided an overview of the newly enacted competition 
legislation in the People’s Republic of China and the interface with intellectual 
property rights. The reaction to the Chinese Anti- Monopoly Law by calling it an 
‘Economic Constitution’
318
 or ‘a milestone in China’s economy’
319
 can be affirmed 
when looking at its content. The Chinese legislative organ obtained technical 
assistance from both the United States of America and the European Union and the 
structure of the AML shows significant similarities to the structure of the European 
Union competition rules. 
In Article 55 AML China has put emphasis on the existence of intellectual 
property rights and states that the exercise thereof is exempted from the application 
of the AML as long as it is in line with the intellectual property legislation. China is 
one of the only jurisdictions that has explicitly stated the exemption of intellectual 
property right holders in its competition law. The relationship between intellectual 
property laws and competition law is a complex issue because intellectual property 
rights create monopolies whereas competition law tries to break down monopolies or 
monopolistic conduct to achieve a fair competition on the market. However, both 
areas of law also share – to some extent – similarities or unified goals such as 
enhancing consumer welfare and promoting innovation and development.
 320
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that intellectual property laws and competition law 
can coexist and ways have to be found to balance the two laws. 
In this dissertation it was established that the current version of the AML still 
contains some ambiguity and uncertainties because the text of the AML does not say 
anything about the scope of Article 55.
321
 It is unclear to whom Article 55 AML 
applies and what conduct amounts to an abuse of intellectual property rights 
according to Article 55 AML. However, the proposed guidelines, which are currently 
drafted by the SAIC will provide some information of how Article 55 AML is meant 
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to be applied and enforced.
322
 These guidelines can be said to be a major step toward 
an effective enforcement of the AML because they will finally clarify which 
exercises will be found to be harmful to competition and therefore, anti- competitive 
and which conduct is pro- competitive and will not be prohibited by the AML. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 the guidelines will also provide rules on 
how to evaluate whether a conduct restricts competition in the meaning of Article 55 
AML. The approach followed by the SAIC shows similarities to the United States 
‘rule of reason’ approach because the harmful effect on competition is to be 
measured by balancing the negative and positive effects on the market and deciding 
upon which impact outweighs the other. Because of that similarity, and also the 
similarity of the AML’s structure to the European Union competition rules, the 
enforcement practises in such states might act as possible ‘signposts’ for China. 
It is suggested that companies and investors engaging in economic activities 
concerning intellectual property rights in the People’s Republic of China align their 
conduct with the Chinese legislation in order to avoid court actions being brought 
against them. The proposed guidelines – discussed in Chapter 3 – offer some 
assistance in that direction because they constitute the first interpretation by an 
official organ concerning the complex issues of Article 55 AML. The previous 
discussion in Chapter 3 shows that companies can make use of defences to avoid 
conviction. First, the firm could use the ‘non- dominant firm defence’ meaning that 
the enterprise relies on its non- dominant position and argues that a conduct by a 
non- dominant firm, even though it might abuse its intellectual property rights, is not 
likely to distort the competition on the internal market.
323
 Another possible defence 
could be provided in Article 15 AML
324
 which exempts monopolistic agreements 
that hinder technological development. It is submitted that enterprises use such 
defences once an action has been filed against them. 
In conclusion it can be said that the communist People’s Republic of China 
has finally made a step toward the liberalisation of the market by promoting private 
competition and discouraging state monopolies. When the AML was first enacted in 
2008 it could have been argued that China only wanted to establish a law in the 
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books without actually enforcing it. Now however, in 2013, the enforcement 
agencies as well as the courts have implemented many guidelines, regulations and 
judicial interpretations that assist in clarifying the application of the AML and it can 
be argued that China has finally shown genuine effort to liberalise its market.
325
 The 
guidelines dealing with the interface of competition law and intellectual property 
which are supposed to be issued this year are long awaited and will finally shed some 
light to the application of the AML to intellectual property right holders. Over time 
the judgments of the courts will also provide assistance to the understanding of the 
AML and provide some legal certainty to the companies doing business in China. 
 Enterprises engaging in economic activities in China are recommended to 
observe and closely watch proposed guidelines, interpretations and cases and align 
their conduct accordingly to avoid court actions.
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